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in the Doctor -Patient Relationship 
Charles J . Dougherty, Ph.D. 
Charles Dougherty received his doctorate in 1975 from the Univer-
sity of Notre Dame and since that time has served as an assistant 
professor in the Department of Philosophy at Creighton University in 
Omaha. 
In this paper I propose to examine three models of the doctor-
patient relationship. After a descriptive characterization of the alterna-
tive models, I will offer a series of arguments to support the claim that 
there is a moral priority of one model over the others, viz. the model 
of mutual participation. 
l. Szasz and Hollender and Veatch 
Thomas Szasz and Marc Hollender have argued that there are three 
basic models of the doctor-patient relationsh ip. 1 The model of Activ-
ity -Passivity is a minimal relationship in the sense that the doctor acts 
and the patient is acted upon. The patient contributes little or nothing 
to the success or failure of therapy. The model is especially appropri-
ate for care of the comatose and the mentally incompetent, including 
children. The model of Guidance-Cooperation is a more genuine rela-
tionship. It is one in which the doctor commands and the patient 
obeys. The patient's cooperation is crucial to therapeutic success (per-
haps the taking of prescribed medicines at the prescribed intervals) but 
he does not enter into the decision -making process. The doctor is 
deferrred to completely in this respect. This model, therefore, is 
highly paternalistic. The third and last model is that of Mutual Partici-
pation. In this relationship doctor and patient are assumed to be rela-
tively equal in power, aware of their mutual interdependence and 
conscious of engaging together in a venture that is satisfying to both . 
This model is most appropriate for the management of chronic and 
degenerative diseases. 
Although Szasz and Hollender claim that model three, Mutual Parti-
cipation, is more highly developed in an evolutionary sense they refuse 
to admit that any of the models is fundamentally better or more 
ethical than the others . Each has, they claim, its appropriate use. 
Robert Veatch in a more recent article offers a similar typology . 2 
The Engineering Model is a relationship in which the doctor views 
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himself as an applied scientist. It makes him "an engineer, a plumber 
making repairs, connecting tubes and flushing out clogged systems, 
with no questions asked." He refrains from considering the moral 
upshot of his activities with the patient. The Priestly Model describes 
just the opposite. Far from refraining from value decision-making, the 
doctor in this model is frankly paternalistic. As a "father" he makes 
the patient's choices for him. Veatch's third model is the Collegial 
Model. In this model the doctor and patient pursue together, as col-
leagues, the common goals of eliminating the patient's disease and 
preserving his health. Trust, confidence and mutuality in decision-
making are the hallmarks of this model. Although obviously attracted 
to this model, Veatch argues that it is overly Utopian and he offers a 
fourth model, the Contractual Model as a suitable compromise with 
social realities . Within this model, mutuality of interest is put aside 
but the norms of freedom, dignity, truth-telling, promise-keeping, 
justice and real sharing in decision-making remain central. 
If we assume that Szasz and Hollender did not intend the model of 
Mutual Participation to include equality of doctor and patient to the 
point of becoming "pals," I think it is fair to say that we have essen-
tially the same three models here: Activity-Passivity or the Engineer-
ing Model, Guidance-Cooperation or the Priestly Model and Mutual 
Participation or the Contractual Model. For the sake of simplicity I will 
refer to these as model one, model two and model three, respectively . 
With reasons not developed by Veatch, I will attempt to do what 
Szasz and Hollender eschewed. I will argue that model three has a 
moral priority over the other two models. This does not mean, of 
course, that there are not circumstances in which models one and two 
might be more appropriate relationships. It does mean that the doctor 
in models one and two has a moral obligation to move the relation-
ship, so far as this is feasible, toward model three. It means, if I am 
correct, that there is a moral directionality, a moral telos, in the 
doctor-patient relationship. 
Broadly speaking, ethicians demonstrate moral obligations in two 
ways : by utilitarian arguments and by deontological arguments. I plan 
to explore both. 
II. Utilitarian Considerations 
My first utilitarian argument will be one to which Veatch did 
allude. The biological revolution which we are witnessing is raising 
moral questions of massive significance. Behavior control techniques, 
genetic engineering, and life support technologies have or will have a 
great impact on the role of the doctor. With respect to these areas, it is 
not possible to speak of what is medically "indicated" without refer-
ence to a background of individual moral choices, social and political 
considerations, and religious and ethnic dispositions. Since the doctor 
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can hardly be considered an expert in all of these fields, maximization 
of good consequences suggests the increasing priority of model three. 
Another aspect of the biological revolution has been medicine's 
control, at least in the economically developed nations, of the infec-
tious diseases. As a result of these successes, chronic and degenerative 
diseases have come to make a much higher percentage of these 
same nations' mortality and morbidity rates. Since chronic and degen-
erative diseases are intimately related to life-styles, model three again 
suggests itself. One is hardly likely to respond favorably to life-style ad-
monitions from a physician without the suppo'rtive background of a re-
lationship of mutuality . Since the doctor can hardly be an expert in all 
the aspects of living these diseases affect (e.g., smoking, drinking, 
eating, exercise), coping with these diseases demands the mutuality of 
decision-making which model three offers. Of the three models, it is 
most likely to produce good consequences in these circumstances. 
A second utilitarian consideration here is the professional fulfill-
ment of the doctor. If his or her primary occupational commitment is 
to help persons recover and maintain their health, the doctor will be 
professionally fulfilled so far as he is accomplishing this goal. Given 
the inevitabilities of disease and death, no doctor can reach complete 
satisfaction on this score. All of his patients will get sick; they will all 
die . Nevertheless, it seems that the doctor's professional satisfaction 
can be maximized by maximizing in tum the number of healthy days 
his patients experience. There is evidence to suggest that patients fol-
low doctors' medical advice better, understand their conditions and 
how better to improve them and are more highly motivated to do so 
when conditions similar to those described upon model three prevail. 3 
A third argument of this sort relies on an interesting observation 
made by Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit. In a master-slave rela-
tionship, Hegel noticed, the master is as enslaved to the relationship as 
the slave. In one crucial respect he fares worse. The slave has the 
master as his representation of what it is to be a human person. He 
relates to a superior person. The master, by contrast, has a slave rep-
resenting humankind. In spite of his practical dominance, the master 
relates to an inferior. The slave will be more psychologically satisfied 
since the role model he perceives is of a higher kind than that the 
master perceives. Extrapolating this insight to the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, the doctor who commits himself to anything less than model 
three condemns himself to a lifetime of relating to inferiors . Only 
model three offers the personal fulfillment of associating with patients 
perceived to be equally worthy persons and, therefore, acceptable role 
models. 
A fourth consequential consideration relates to the patient's percep-
tion of the doctor. For a number of reasons patients are not usually 
able to evaluate the medical abilities of the doctor. Their judgment of 
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the doctor and their subsequent satisfaction with him will often be 
based upon other factors. Important among these factors is the doc-
tor's affective behavior, especially his ability to feel and demonstrate 
empathy with his patients .4 The chances for empathetic relationships 
and positive affective behavior in general would seem to be increased 
in model three. Therefore, if a doctor is concerned to maximize client 
satisfaction and his good reputation, he will commit himself to model 
three. 
Fifth and finally, we should consider the impact of these various 
models on medical care as a system. Because of the increased use of 
medical machinery, the over-specialization of health care professionals 
and the bureaucratic elements of hospital care, contemporary medi-
cine is frequently charged with dehumanizing and alienating its cus-
tomers. A wholesale institutional commitment to model three might 
go a long way to responding to these charges. It might increase the 
presently diminishing prestige of medical practice. It might even help 
to reduce the number of medical malpractice suits. 
All of these considerations provide utilitarian support for the claim 
that there is a moral directionality in the doctor-patient relationship. 
Good consequences will be maximized when the doctor, wherever 
possible, moves his relationship with his patients toward model three, 
toward mutual participation . 
III. Deontological Support 
Utilitarian arguments rely on consequences. The central problem 
with this reliance, from an ethical point of view, is that consequences 
are empirical sorts of things. It is often difficult to tell with any degree 
of certitude whether some event is an empirical consequence of 
another event. Additionally, there are always empirical facts on the 
other side of the ledger, those alleging that one's choice, in fact, will 
lead to more evil than good, more pain than pleasure. These claims are 
notoriously difficult to measure and evaluate. Perhaps most doctors 
will actually prefer the dominance of model two to the equal role 
presentations of model three . Perhaps most patients prefer to be told 
in a blatantly paternalistic manner what to do and what not to do. 
And even if only a few of each prefer these options, perhaps their 
displeasure at losing a model one or two relationship "outweighs" the 
good consequences gained by others adopting model three. Faced with 
these and similar problems, ethicians are likely to seek support for 
their views with deontological arguments. 
The most straightforward deontological approach here would be to 
insist that as persons, doctors have an obligation to treat other persons 
as equals. They must treat their patients as infinitely valuable ends-in-
themselves . They must be prepared to universalize their choices, to 
only choose as every person would choose, as one would have the 
patient choose for the doctors were the roles reversed . Models one and 
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two may at times be necessary compromises with circumstances but 
model three because of its very character is obligatory for the doctor 
because of his nature as a person. 
As simple as this sounds it relies on a powerful assumption of the 
metaphysics of personhood. One . must have already demonstrated 
value of the person before any such argument as the one above can get 
started. Unfortunately this is just what the biological revolution is 
undermining. New behavior control techniques push us toward view-
ing the person merely as a seat of highly manipulable behaviors. Dis-
cussions of genetic engineering often lead one to suspect that persons 
are being made equivalent to organic transmitters of DNA. The recent 
sophistications of medical technologies, especially life support machin-
ery, often place individuals in situations that threaten to make persons 
a category of experimental and research materials. The deontological 
argument sketched above would appear to be a begging of the ques-
tion, an assuming of a metaphysics which is itself at stake. 
These problems are overwhelming philosophically. Faced with am-
biguities and doubts in utilitarian arguments and the difficulties in 
providing philosophical ground for deontological approaches one 
might be inclined to foresake a theoretical solution altogether. Phil-
osophically, that may be the appropriate response. However, these are 
not simply philosophical problems. The question of the moral dimen-
sions of the doctor-patient relationship is equally a social problem for 
medicine as a whole and an existential problem for the doctor. In this 
light, a solution suggests itself. When we are speaking of medical prac-
tice in general and doctors in particular we are not speaking of neutral 
participants. If the assumption referred to above, viz., that medical 
institutions and doctors are committed to helping persons recover and 
maintain their health, is accurate, then medicine and doctors have 
overcome this philosophical difficulty by what amounts to a leap of 
faith. Theirs is not a descriptive commitment based on anticipated 
consequences or metaphysical considerations; it is, instead, prescrip-
tive. Medicine as an institution and doctors as individuals have already 
bound themselves to the value of persons. They have already assumed 
moral obligations. The de ontological task, then, is a far less onerous 
one. The commitment having been made, the ethician need only spell 
out the implications . 
Presumably the doctor chose his profession because he had some 
intimate acquaintance with the need for doctoring, perhaps his own 
suffering or that of someone close. Building on this as an existential 
point of departure, the ethician can point out that the obligation 
which follows upon this is one which mirrors the original commit-
ment: to treat others as you would have yourself or loved one treated. 
Once this is accepted, all the Kantian apparatus of personhood will 
follow . There is no need for metaphysics. Model three, mutual partici-
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pation in the doctor-patient relationship, will be grounded in the 
nature of the doctor's personal commitment and medicine's institu-
tional commitment to helping other persons recover and maintain 
their health. 
IV. Some Results 
Suppose that the conjunction of utilitarian and deontological argu-
ments offered here is compelling; what follows? What would be some 
results of the general adoption of model three? Let me suggest just 
two of them: the effect on patients and the impact on medical edu-
cation. 
My suspicion is that most patients would welcome a more open 
mutual relationship with their doctors. However, model three entails a 
greater responsibility on the patient's part and this may result in a 
good deal of resistance. There is comfort in having others make our 
choices for us. Like the adolescent who wants freedom from parental 
control but not responsibility for his decisions, and the student who 
wants flexibility in educational requirements but not responsibility for 
academic choices, there will be patients who want the sharing of medi-
cal information but not the responsibility of shared decisions. This is a 
fact with which doctors will have to deal constructively . As doctor-
patient relationships more and more approach model three, doctors 
will increasingly earn their appellations. They will have to be doctors 
in the fullest sense; they will have to teach (docere). What they will 
teach will be responsible care of one's own health. 
The future appears to hold great challenges for the doctor. Coping 
with the fruits of the biological revolution, with community demands 
for better care and with model three patient relationships will require 
a special kind of person. It is the responsibility of medical education 
to see to it today that we have these individuals when we need them 
tomorrow. If what has been said here is at all correct, medical educa-
tion will have to emphasize new skills and sensitivities. Behavioral 
sciences and humanities will have to take their places with the natural 
sciences and the clinical training. Techniques for effective informa-
tional and affective communication will have to be taught. Ethics will 
be a central concern. Above all, medical schools will have to become 
places where idealism and humanitarian commitments are nurtured 
and can grow. That this is not already the case today portends ill for 
tomorrow. Medical education today increases cynicism and decreases 
attitudes of idealism and humanitarianism. 5 This is not compatible with 
the demands of model three. 
Beginning with three models of the doctor-patient relationship pre-
sented by Szasz and Hollender and also to some extent by Veatch, I 
have argued for the normative priority of the model of mutual partici-
pation. For reasons both utilitarian and deontological, there is a moral 
directionality in the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors, as doctors 
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and as persons, have the obligation to move their patient relationships 
toward model three. This may, indeed, place greater burdens on the 
patient and on medical educators as well as the doctors. These burdens 
will have to be shouldered if we are to cope with the biological revolu-
tion, the demands for greater lay participation in the decisions of the 
professions and our duties as doctors, patients and educators. 
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